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tecting children from suspicious Internet content are different factors that lead to move the ac-
cess control from servers to clients. Several encryption schemes can be used to serve this pur-
pose but all suffer from a static way of sharing data. With the emergence of hardware and
software security elements on client devices, more dynamic client-based access control schemes
can be devised. This paper proposes an efficient client-based evaluator of access control rules 
for regulating access to XML documents. This evaluator takes benefit from a dedicated index to 
quickly converge towards the authorized parts of a – potentially streaming – document. Addi-
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Client-Based Access Control Management for XML 
documents
Résumé: La confiance limitée accordée aux serveurs traditionnels de bases de données et aux
Database Service Provider (DSP), l’ intérêt croissant pour la dissémination de données et le
besoin de filtrer certains contenus digitaux (e.g., contrôle parental) sont différents facteurs
motivant la migration du contrôle d’ accès du serveur rs le client. Plusieurs schémas de 
chiffrement peuvent être utilisés dans ce but mais tous imposent un partage statique des 
données. L'apparition d’ éléments sécurisés matériels et logiciels sur les terminaux clients 
permet d'envisager des schémas dynamiques de contrôle d’ accès. 
Cet article présente une solution de ce type pour évaluer efficacement des règles de contrôle 
d’ accès à des documents XML, éventuellement transmis en flux. Une technique spécifique
d'indexation est proposée pour converger rapidement v rs les parties autorisés du document
XML. Des mécanismes additionnels de sécurité garantissent que les données prohibées ne sont 
jamais révélées lors du traitement et que le document en entrée est protégé contre toute forme
de modification illicite. L’ approche est validée par des expériences sur des données
synthétiques et réelles.
Mots clés:contrôle d’ accès XML, confidentialité des données, g tion ubiquitaire de données, 
carte à puce 
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1 Introduction
Access control management is one of the foundation ste of database systems and is tradi-
tionally performed by the servers, the place where the trust is. This situation, however, is rap-
idly evolving due to very different factors: the suspicion about Database Service Providers
(DSP) regarding data confidentiality preservation [HIL02, BoP02], the increasing vulnerability
of database servers facing external and internal attcks [FBI03], the emergence of decentralized 
ways to share and process data thanks to peer-to-peer databases [NOT03] or license-based dis-
tribution systems [XrM] and the ever-increasing concer  of parents and teachers to protect
children by controlling and filtering out what they access on the Internet [PIC]. 
The common consequence of these orthogonal factors is to move access control from serv-
ers to clients. Due to the intrinsic untrustworthiness of client devices, all client-based access 
control solutions rely on data encryption. The data are kept encrypted at the server and a client
is granted access to subparts of them according to the decryption keys in its possession. Sophis-
ticated variations of this basic model have been design d in different contexts, such as DSP 
[HIL02], database server security [HeW01], non-profit and for-profit publishing [MiS03,
BCF01, Med] and multilevel databases [AkT82, BZN01, RRN02]. These models differ in sev-
eral ways: data access model (pulled vs. pushed), access right model (DAC, RBAC, MAC), 
encryption scheme, key delivery mechanism and granularity of sharing. However these models
have in common to minimize the trust required on the client at the price of a static way of shar-
ing data. Indeed, whatever the granularity of sharing, the dataset is split in subsets reflecting a
current sharing situation, each encrypted with a different key, or composition of keys. Thus,
access control rules intersections are precompiled by the encryption. Once the dataset is en-
crypted, changes in the access control rules definition may impact the subset boundaries, hence
incurring a partial re-encryption of the dataset and  potential redistribution of keys.
Unfortunately, there are many situations where access control rules are user specific, dy-
namic and then difficult to predict. Let us consider a community of users (family, friends, re-
search team) sharing data via a DSP or in a peer-to-peer fashion (agendas, address books, pro-
files, research experiments, working drafts, etc.). It is likely that the sharing policies change as 
the initial situation evolves (relationship between users, new partners, new projects with diverg-
ing interest, etc.). The exchange of medical information is traditionally ruled by strict sharing
policies to protect the patient’s privacy but these rul s may suffer exceptions in particular situa-
tions (e.g., in case of emergency) [ABM03], may evolve over time (e.g., depending on the pa-
tient’s treatment) and may be subject to provisional authorizations [KmS00]. In the same way,
there is no particular reason for a corporate database hosted by a DSP to have more static ac-
cess control rules than its home-administered counterpart [BoP02]. Regarding parental control,
neither Web site nor Internet Service Provider can predict the diversity of access control rules 
that parents with different sensibility are willing to enforce. Finally, the diversity of publishing
models (non-profit or lucrative) leads to the definition of sophisticated access control languages 
like XrML or ODRL [XrM, ODR]. The access control rules being more complex, the encrypted 
content and the licenses are managed through different channels, allowing different privileges
to be exercised by different users on the same encrypted content.
In the meantime, software and hardware architectures ar  rapidly evolving to integrate ele-
ments of trust in client devices. Windows Media9 [Med] is an example of software solution
securing published digital assets on PC and consumer electronics. Secure tokens and smart
cards plugged or embedded into different devices (e.g., PC, PDA, cellular phone, set-top-box)
are hardware solutions exploited in a growing variety of applications (certification, authentica-
tion, electronic voting, e-payment, healthcare, digital right management, etc.). Finally, TCPA
[TCP] is a hybrid solution where a secured chip is used to certify the software’s installed on a 
given platform, preventing them from hacking. Thus, Secure Operating Environments (SOE)
become a reality on client devices [Vin02]. SOE guarantee a high tamper-resistance, generally 
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on limited resources (e.g., a small portion of stable storage and RAM is protected to preserve
secrets like encryption keys and sensitive data structu es).
The objective of this paper is to exploit these new elements of trust in order to devise
smarter client-based access control managers. The goal pursued is being able to evaluate dy-
namic and personalized access control rules on a ciphered input document, with the benefit of
dissociating access rights from encryption. The considered input documents are XML docu-
ments, the de-facto standard for data exchange. Authorization models proposed for regulating
access to XML documents use XPath expressions to delineate the scope of each access control 
rule [BCF01, GaB01, DDP02]. Having this context in mind, the problem addressed in this pa-
per can be stated as follows. 
Problem statement
To propose an efficient streaming access control rules evaluator 
The streaming requirement is twofold. First, the evaluator must adapt to the memory con-
strained SOE, thereby precluding materialization (e.g., building a DOM representation of
the document). Second, some target applications mention d above are likely to consume
streaming documents. Efficiency is, as usual, an important concern.
To guarantee that prohibited information is never disclosed 
The access control being realized on the client device, no clear-text data but the authorized 
ones must be made accessible to the untrusted part of this client device.
To protect the input document from any form of tampering
Under the assumption that the SOE is secure, the only way to misleadthe ccess control
rule evaluator is to tamper the input document, for example by substituting or modifying
encrypted blocks.
Contributions
To tackle this problem, we make the following four contributions:
1. Accurate streaming access control rules evaluator
We propose a streaming evaluator of XML access control rules, supporting a robust subset 
of the XPath language. At first glance, one may consider that evaluating a set of XPath-
based access control rules and a set of XPath queries over a streaming document are equiva-
lent problems [DF03, GMO03, CFG02]). However, accesscontrol rules are not independ-
ent. They may generate conflicts or become redundant on given parts of the document. The 
proposed evaluator detects accurately these situations and exploits them to stop eagerly 
rules becoming irrelevant.
2. Skip index
We design a streaming and compact index structure allowing to quickly converge towards
the authorized parts of the input document, while skipping the others, and to compute the
intersection with a potential query expressed on this document (in a pull context). Indexing
is of utmost importance considering the two limiting factors of the target architecture: the
cost of decryption in the SOE and the cost of communication between the SOE, the client
and the server. This second contribution complements the first one to match the perform-
ance objective.
3. Pending predicates management
Pending predicates (i.e., a predicate P conditioning the delivery of a subtree S but encoun-
tered after S while parsing the document) are difficult to manage. We propose a strategy to
detect eagerly the pending parts of the document, to skip them at parsing time and to reas-
semble afterwards the relevant pending parts at the rig t place in the final result. 
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4. Random integrity checking
We combine hashing and encryption techniques to make the integrity of the document veri-
fiable despite the forward and backward random accesses generated by the two preceding 
contributions.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the XML access control model we 
consider and illustrates it on a motivating example. S ctions 3 - 6 detail the four contributions
mentioned above. Section 7 presents experimental results based on both synthetic and real data-
sets. Section 8 concludes. Related works are addressed throughout each section. 
2 Access control model 
Access control model semantics 
Several authorization models have been recently proposed for regulating access to XML 
documents. Most of these models follow the well-established Discretionary Access Control
(DAC) model [BCF01, GaB01, DDP02], even though RBAC and MAC models have also been
considered [Cha00, CAL02]. We introduce below a simplfied access control model for XML, 
inspired by Bertino’s model [BCF01] and Samarati’s model [DDP02] that roughly share the
same foundation. Subtleties of these models are ignored for the sake of simplicity.
In this simplified model, access control rules, or access rules for short, take the form of a 3-
uple <sign, subject, object>. Sign denotes either a permission (positive rule) or a prohibition
(negative rule) for the read operation.Subject is self-explanatory.Object corresponds to ele-
ments or subtrees in the XML document, identified by an XPath expression. The expressive
power of the access control model, and then the granularity of sharing, is directly bounded by 
the supported subset of the XPath language. In this paper, we consider a rather robust subset of 
XPath denoted by XP{[],*,//} [MiS02]. This subset, widely used in practice, consists of node tests,
the child axis (/), the descendant axis (//), wildcards (*) and predicates or branches […]. Attrib-
utes are handled in the model similarly to elements a d are not further discussed.
The cascading propagation of rules is implicit in the model, meaning that a rule propagates
from an object to all its descendants in the XML hierarchy. Due to this propagation mechanism
and to the multiplicity of rules for a same user, a conflict resolution principle is required. Con-
flicts are resolved using two policies:Denial-Takes-Precedenceand Most-Specific-Object-
Takes-Precedence. Let assume two rules R1 and R2 of opposite sign. These rules may conflict
either because they are defined on the same object, or because they are defined respectively on 
two different objects O1 and O2, linked by an ancestor/descendant relationship (i.e., O1 is an-
cestor of O2). In the former situation, theD nial-Takes-Precedencepolicy favors the negative
rule. In the latter situation, theMost-Specific-Object-Takes-Precedencepolicy favors the rule
that applies directly to an object against the inherited one (i.e., R2 takes precedence over R1 on 
O2). Finally, if a subject is granted access to an object, the path from the document root to this 
object is granted too (names of denied elements in this path can be replaced by a dummy
value). ThisStructural rule keeps the document structure consistent with respect to the original
one.
The set of rules attached to a given subject on a given document is called anaccess control 
policy. This policy defines an authorized view of this document and, depending on the application
context, this view may be queried. We consider that queries are expressed with the same XPath
fragment as access rules, namely XP{[],*,//} . Semantically, the result of a query is computed from
the authorized view of the queried document (e.g., predicates cannot be expressed on denied ele-
ments even if these elements do not appear in the query result). However, access rules predicates 
can apply on any part of the initial document.
Motivating example
We use an XML document representing medical folders to illustrate the semantics of the access 
control model and to serve as motivating example. A sample of this document is pictured in
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Figure 1, along with the access control policies associated to three profiles of users: secretaries, 
doctors and medical researchers. A secretary is granted access only to the patient’s administra-
tive subfolders. A doctor is granted access to the patient’s administrative subfolders and to all 
medical acts and analysis of her patients, except the details for acts she did not carry out her-
self. Finally, a researcher is granted access only to the laboratory results and the age of patients 
who have subscribed to a protocol test of type G3, provided the measurement for the element
Cholesterol does not exceed 250mg/dL.
Medical applications exemplify the need for dynamic a cess rules. For example, a re-
searcher may be granted an exceptional and time-limited access to a fragment of all medical
folders where the rate of Cholesterol exceeds 300mg/dL (a rather rare situation). A patient hav-
ing subscribed to a protocol to test the effectiveness of a new treatment may revoke this proto-
col at any time due to a degradation of her state of health or for any other personal reasons.
Models compiling access control policies in the data encryption cannot tackle this dynamicity.
However, the reasons to encrypt the data and delegat  the access control to the clients are mani-
fold: exchanging data among medical research teams in a protected peer-to-peer fashion, pro-
tect the data from external attacks as well as from internal attacks. The latter aspect is particu-
larly important in the medical domain due to the very high level of confidentiality attached to
the data and to the very high level of decentralization of the information system (e.g., small
clinics and general practitioners are prompted to subcontract the management of their informa-
tion system).
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Doctor access control policy
D1: , //Folder/Admin
D2: , //MedActs[//RPhys = USER]
D3: , //Act[RPhys != USER]/Details
D4: ,  //Folder[MedActs//RPhys = USER]/Analysis 
Researcher access control policy 
R1: , //Folder[Protocol]//Age 
R2: , //Folder[Protocol/Type=G3//LabResults//G3
R3: , //G3[Cholesterol > 250]
Rules 2 & 3 occur for each of the 10 groups {G1..G10} 
Secretary access control policy 
S1: ,  //Admin
Figure 1. Hospital XML document 
Target architectures 
Figure 2 pictures an abstract representation of the target architecture for the motivating ex-
ample as well as for the applications mentioned in the introduction. The access control being 
evaluated on the client, the client device has to be made tamper resistant thanks to a Secure
Operating Environment (SOE). As discussed in the introduction, this SOE can rely on software
or hardware solutions or on a mix of them. In the sequel of this paper, and up to the perform-
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ance evaluation section, we make no assumption on the SOE, except the traditional ones: 1) the
code executed by the SOE cannot be corrupted, 2) the SOE has at least a small quantity of se-
cure stable storage (to store secrets like encryption keys), 3) the SOE has at least a small quan-
tity of secure working memory (to protect sensitive data structures at processing time). In our
context, the SOE is in charge of decrypting the input document, checking its integrity and 
evaluating the access control policy corresponding to a given (document, subject) pair.  This 
access control policy as well as the key(s) required to ecrypt the document can be permanently
hosted by the SOE, refreshed or downloaded via a secure hannel from different sources
(trusted third party, security server, parent or teacher, etc). 
Client device
Encrypted XML doc.
Secured channel
Access control rules
Encryption keys
[Query]
Authorized
doc view
Authorized
query result
or
SOE
Decryption
Integrity control
Access control
Figure 2. Abstract target architecture 
3 Streaming the access control 
While several access control models for XML have been proposed recently, few papers address 
the enforcement of these models and, to the best of our knowledge, no one considers access
control in a streaming fashion. At first glance, streaming access control resembles the well-
known problem of XPath processing on streaming documents. There is a large body of work on 
this latter problem in the context of XML filtering[DF03, GMO03, CFG02]. These studies
consider a very large number of XPath expressions (typically tens of thousands). The primary
goal here is to select the subset of queries matching a given document (the query result is not a 
concern) and the focus is on indexing and/or combining a large amount of queries. One of the
first works addressing the precise evaluation of complex XPath expressions over streaming
documents is due to [PfC03] which proposes a solution to deliver parts of a document matching
a single XPath. While access rules are expressed in XPath, the nature of our problem differs 
significantly from the preceding ones. Indeed, the rul propagation principle along with its as-
sociated conflict resolution policies (see section 2) makes access rules not independent. The 
interference between rules introduces two new important issues:
Access rules evaluation:for each node of the input document, the evaluator must be capable 
of determining the set of rules that applies to it and for each rule determining if it applies di-
rectly or is inherited. The nesting of the access rules scopes determines the authorization 
outcome for that node. This problem is made more complex by the fact that some rules are
evaluated lazily due to pending predicates.
Access control optimization:the nesting of rule scopes associated with the conflict resolution
policies inhibits the effect of some rules. The rule evaluator must take advantage of this in-
hibition to suspend the evaluation of these rules and even to suspend the evaluation of all
rules if a global decision can be reached for a given subtree. 
3.1 Access rules evaluation 
As streaming documents are considered, we make the assumption that the evaluator is fed by an
event-based parser (e.g., SAX [SAX]) raising open, value and close events respectively for 
each opening, text and closing tag in the input document.
We represent each access rule (i.e., XPath expression) by a non-deterministic finite automa-
ton (NFA) [HoU79]. Figure 3.b pictures the Access Rules Automata (ARA) corresponding to
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two rather simple access rules expressed on an abstract XML document. This abstract example,
used in place of the motivating example introduced in Section 2, gives us the opportunity to 
study several situations (including the trickiest ones) on a simple document. In our ARA repre-
sentation, a circle denotes a state and a double circle a final state, both identified by a unique
StateId. Directed edges represent transitions, triggered byopenevents matching the edge label
(either an element name or *). Thus, directed edges represent the child (/) XPath axis or a wild-
card depending on the label. To model the descendant axis (//), we add a self-transition with a
label * matched by anyopen event. An ARA includes onenavigational path and optionally one 
or severalpredicate paths(in grey in the figure). To manage the set of ARA representing a 
given access control policy, we introduce the following data structures: 
Tokens and Token Stack: we distinguish betweenavigational tokens (NT) andpredicate
tokens (PT) depending on the ARA path they are involved in. To model the traversal of an 
ARA by a given token, we actually create a token proxy each time a transition is triggered 
and we label it with the destination StateId. The terms token and token proxy are used inter-
changeably in the rest of the paper. The navigation progress in all ARA is memorized
thanks to a unique stack-based data structure called Token Stack. The top of the stack con-
tains all active NT and PT tokens, i.e. tokens thatcan trigger a new transition at the next in-
coming event. Tokens created by a triggered transitio are pushed in the stack. The stack is 
popped at each close event. The goal of Token Stack is twofold: allowing a straightforward
backtracking in all ARA and reducing the number of tokens to be checked at each event 
(only the active ones, at the top of the stack, are considered). 
Rule status and Authorization Stack:Let assume for the moment that access rule expres-
sions do not exploit the descendant axis (no //). In this case, a rule is said to beactive, – 
meaning that its scope covers the current node and its subtree – if all final states of its ARA
contain a token. A rule is saidpending if the final state of its navigational path containsa
token while the final state of some predicate path has not yet been reached. TheAuthoriza-
tion Stack registers the NT tokens having reached the final state of a navigational path, at a
given depth in the document. The scope of the corresponding rule is bounded by the time
the NT token remains in the stack. This stack is used to solve conflicts between rules. The
status of a rule present in the stack can be fourfold: positive-active (denoted by ), positive-
pending (denoted by ?), negative-active (denoted by ), negative-pending (denoted by
?). By convention, the bottom of the stack contains an implicit negative-activerule mate-
rializing a closed access control policy (i.e., by default, the set of objects the user is granted 
access to is empty).
Rule instances materialization: Taking into account the descendant axis (//) in the access 
rules expressions makes things more complex to manage. Indeed, the same element names
can be encountered at different depths in the same document, leading several tokens to
reach the final state of a navigational path and predicate paths in the same ARA, without be-
ing related together4. To tackle this situation, we label navigational and predicate token
proxies with thedepth at which the original predicate token has been created, materializing
their participation in the samerule instance5. Consequently, a token (proxy) must hold the
following information: RuleId (denoted by R, S, …), Navigational/Predicate status (denoted
by n or p), StateId and Depth6. For example,Rn22 and Rp42 (also noted2 ,2 42 to simplify the
4 The complexity of this problem has been highlighted in [PfC03].
5 To illustrate this, let us consider the rule R and the right subtree of the document presented in .
The predicate path final state5 (expressing //b[c]) can be reached from two different insta ces of b, re-
spectively located at depth 2 and 3 in the document, while the navigational path final state 3 (expressing 
//b/d) can be reached only from b located at depth 3. Thus, a single rule instance is valid here, materialized
by navigational and predicate tokens proxies labeled with the same depth 3. 
Figure 3
6 If a same ARA contains different predicate paths starting at different levels of the navigational path, a 
NT token will have in addition to register all PT tokens related to it. 
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figures) denotes the navigational and predicate tokens created in Rule R’s ARA at the time
element b is encountered at depth 2 in the document.If the transition between states 4 and 5 
of this ARA is triggered, a token proxyRp52 will be created and will represent the progress
of the original tokenRp4 in the ARA2 . All these tokens refer to the same rule instance since
they are labeled by the same depth. A rule instance is said to beactive or pending under the
same condition as before, taking into account only the tokens related to this instance.
Predicate Set: this set registers the PT tokens having reached the final state of a predicate 
path. A PT token, representing a predicate instance, is discarded from this set at the time the
current depth in the document becomes less than its own depth.
Stack-based data structures are well adapted to the trav rsal of a hierarchical document.
However, we need a direct access to any stack level to update pending information and to allow 
some optimizations detailed below. Figure 3.c represents an execution snapshot based on these
data structures. This snapshot being almost self-explanatory, we detail only a small subset of
steps.
(3)  c
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22: Navigational Token
42: Predicate Token
: Token in a final state32
Figure 3. Execution snapshot 
Step 2: the open event b generates two tokensRn22 andRp42, participating in the same rule
instance.
Step 3: the ARA of the negative rule S reaches its final state and an active instance of S is
pushed in the Authorization Stack. The current authorization remains negative. Token Rp52
enters the Predicate Set. The corresponding predicat will be considered true until level 2 of 
the Token Stack is popped (i.e., until event/b is produced at step 9). Thus, there is no need 
to continue to evaluate this predicate in this subtree and tokenRp42 can be discarded from
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the Token Stack.
Step 5: An active instance of the positive rule R is pushed in the Authorization Stack. The
current authorization becomes positive, allowing the delivery of element d.
Step 16: A new instance of R is pushed in the Authorization Stack, represented by token
Rn33. This instance is pending since the tokenRp52 pushed in the Predicate Set at step 12 
(eventc) does not participate in the same rule instance.
Step 18: Token Rp53 enters the Predicate Set, changing the status of the associated rule in-
stance to positive-active. The management of pending predicates and their effct on the de-
livery process is more deeply studied in section 5.
3.2 Conflict Resolution
From the information kept in the Authorization Stack, the outcome of the current document
node can be easily determined. The conflict resolution algorithm presented in Figure 4 integrates
the closed access control policy (line 1), theD nial-Takes-Precedence(line 2) and Most-
Specific-Object-Takes-Precedence (lines 5 and 7) policies to reach a decision. In the algorithm,
AS denotes the Authorization Stack and AS[i].RuleStatus denotes the set of status of all rules
registered at level i in this stack. In the first call of this recursive algorithm, depth corresponds to
the top of AS. Recursion captures the fact that a decision may be reached even if the rules at the 
top of the stack are pending, depending on the rule status found in the lower stack levels. Note,
however, that the decision can remain pending if a pending rule at the top of the stack conflicts
with other rules. In that case, the current node has to be buffered, waiting for a delivery condi-
tion. This issue is tackled in section 5. The rest ofthe algorithm is self-explanatory and examples
of conflict resolutions are given in the figure.
The DecideNode algorithm presented below considers only the access rules. Things are
slightly more complex if queries are considered too.Queries are expressed in XPath and are 
translated in a non-deterministic finite automaton in a way similar to access rules. However, a 
query cannot be regarded as an access rule at conflict resolution time. The delivery condition 
for the current node of a document becomes twofold: (1) the delivery decision must be true and
(2) the query must be interested in this node. The first condition is the outcome of the Decide-
Node algorithm. The second condition is matched if the query is active, that is if all final states
of the query ARA contain a token, meaning that the current node is part of the query scope. 
DecideNode(depth)  Decision  { , ,?}
1: If depth = 0 then return  
2: elseif    AS[depth].RuleStatus then return  
3:    elseif    AS[depth].RuleStatus and
4:  
?
  AS[depth].RuleStatus then return  
5: elseif DecideNode(depth -1) =   and
6: t {
?
, } t  AS[depth].RuleStatus then return  
7: elseif DecideNode(depth -1) =   and
8: 
?
  AS[depth] RuleStatus then return  
9: else return ?
?
?
?
?
? ?
Examples of conflict resolution
Figure 4. Conflict resolution algorithm
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3.3 Optimization issues 
The first optimization that can be devised is doing a static analysis of the system of rules com-
posing an access control policy. Query containment property can be exploited to decrease the 
complexity of this system of rules. Let us denote by  the containment relation between rules
R, S …T. If S R  (R.Sign=S.Sign), the elimination of S could be envisioned. However, this
elimination is precluded if, for example,T / T R  (T.Sign R.Sign)  (S T). Thus, rules 
cannot be pairwise examined and the problem turns to check whether some partial order among
rules can be defined wrt. the containment relation, e.g., {Ti, …Tk}  {Si, …Sk}  {R i, …Rk}
i, (Ri.Sign=Si.Sign  Si.Sign Ti.Sign)  {Si, …Sk} can be eliminated. Note that this strong
elimination condition is sufficient but not necessary. For instance, let R and S be two positive
rules respectively expressed by /a and /a/b[P1] andT be a negative rule expressed by /a/b[P2]/c.
S can still be eliminated while TS, because the containment holds for each subtree where t  
two rules are active together. The problem is particularly complex considering that the query
containment problem itself has been shown co-NP complete for the class of XPath expressions
of interest, that is XP{[],//,*} [MiS02]. This issue could be further investigated since more favor-
able results have been found for subclasses of XP{[],//,*}  [ACL01], but this work is outside the
scope of this paper. 
A second form of optimization is to suspend dynamically the evaluation of ARA that be-
come irrelevant or useless inside a subtree. The knowledge gathered in the Token Stack, Au-
thorization Stack and Predicate Set can be exploited to this end. The first optimization is to sus-
pend the evaluation of a predicate in a subtree as soon as an instance of this predicate has been 
evaluated to true in this subtree. This optimization has been illustrated by Step 3 of Figure 3.c.
The second optimization is to evaluate dynamically the containment relation between active and 
pending rules and take benefit of the elimination cdition mentioned above. From the Au-
thorization Stack, we can detect situations where the following local condition holds: (T  S 
R)  (R.Sign=S.Sign  S.Sign T.Sign), the stack levels reflecting the containmentr lation in-
side the current subtree. S can be inhibited in this subtree. If stopping the evaluation of some
ARA is beneficial, one must keep in mind that the two limiting factors of our architecture are 
the decryption cost and the communication cost. Therefore, the real challenge is being able to
take a common decision for complete subtrees, a necessary condition to detect and skip prohib-
ited subtrees, thereby saving both decryption and communication costs.
Without any additional information on the input document, a common decision can be taken 
for a complete subtree rooted at node n iff: (1) the DecideNode algorithm can deliver a decision 
D (either  or ) for n itself and (2) a rule R whose sign contradicts D cannot become active
inside this subtree (meaning that all its final states, of navigational path and potential predicate
paths, cannot be reached altogether). These two conditions are compiled in the algorithm pre-
sented in Figure 5. In this algorithm, AS denotes the Authorization Stack, TS the Token Stack,
TS[i].NT (resp. TS[i].PT) the set of NT (resp. PT) tokens registered at leveli in this stack and
top is the level of the top of a stack. In addition, t.RuleInst denotes the rule instance associated 
with a given token, Rule.Sign the sign of this rule and Rule.Pred a boolean indicating if this
rule includes predicates in its definition.
DecideSubtree()  Decision  { , ,?}
1: D = DecideNode(AS.top)
2: if D = ? then return ? 
3: if not (  nt TS[top].NT / nt.Rule.Sign  D 
4:                  and (not nt.Rule.Pred 
5:                           or (  pt TS[top].PT / pt.RuleInst = nt.RuleInst)) 
6: then TS[top].NT = ; return (D) 
7:  else return ? 
Figure 5. Decision on a complete subtree 
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The immediate benefit of this algorithm is to stop he evaluation for any active NT tokens
and the main expected benefit is to skip the complete subtree if this decision is . Note how-
ever that only NT tokens are removed from the stack at line 6 The reason for this is that active
PT tokens must still be considered, otherwise pending predicates could remain pending forever.
As a conclusion, a subtree rooted atn can be actually skipped iff: (1) the decision for n is ,
(2) the DecideSubtree algorithm decides and (3) there are no PT token at the top of the To-
ken Stack (which turns to be empty). Unfortunately,these conditions are rarely met together,
especially when the descendant axis appears in the expr ssion of rules and predicates. The next 
section introduces a Skip index structure that gives useful information about the forthcoming
content of the input document. The goal of this index is to detect a priori rules and predicates
that will become irrelevant, thereby increasing the probability to meet the aforementioned con-
ditions.
When queries are considered, any subtree not contained in the query scope is candidate to a 
skip. This situation holds as soon as the NT token of the query (or NT tokens when several in-
stances of the same query can co-exist) becomes inactive (i.e., is no longer element of 
TS[top].NT). This token can be removed from the Token Stack but potential PT tokens related
to the query must still be considered, again to prevent pending predicate to remain pending for-
ever. As before, the subtree will be actually skipped if the Token Stack becomes empty.
4 Skip index 
This section introduces a new form of indexation structure, calledSkip Index, designed to de-
tect and skip the unauthorized fragments (wrt. an access control policy) and the irrelevant 
fragments (wrt. a potential query) of an XML document, while satisfying the constraints intro-
duced by the target architecture (streaming encrypted document, scarce SOE storage capacity). 
The first distinguishing feature of the required inex is the necessity to keep it encrypted 
outside of the SOE to guarantee the absence of information disclosure. The second distinguish-
ing feature (related to the first one and to the SOE storage capacity) is that the SOE must man-
age the index in a streaming fashion, similarly to the document itself. These two features lead to 
design a very compact index (its decryption and transmission overhead must not exceed its own 
benefit), embedded in the document in a way compatible with streaming. For these reasons, we
concentrate on indexing the structure of the document, pushing aside the indexation of its con-
tent. Structural summaries [ABC04] or XML skeleton [BGK03] could be considered as candi-
date for this index. Beside the fact that they may conflict with the size and streaming require-
ments, these approaches do not capture the irregulaity of XML documents (e.g., medical fold-
ers are likely to differ from one instance to another while sharing the same general structure).
In the following, we propose a highly compact structural index, encoded recursively into the
XML document to allow streaming. An interesting side effect of the proposed indexation
scheme is to provide new means to further compress the tructural part of the document.
4.1   Skip Index encoding scheme 
The primary objective of the index is to detect rules and queries that cannot apply inside a
given subtree, with the expected benefit to skip this subtree if the conditions stated in section
3.3 are met. Keeping the compactness requirement in mind, the minimal structural information
required to achieve this goal is the set of element tags, or tags for short, that appear in each sub-
tree. While this metadata does not capture the tags nesting, it reveals oneself as a very effective
way to filter out irrelevant XPath expressions. We propose below data structures encoding this 
metadata in a highly compact way. These data structures are illustrated in Figure 7.a on an ab-
stract XML document.
Encoding the set of descendant tags: The size of the input document being a concern, we 
make the rather classic assumption that the document structure is compressed thanks to a 
INRIA
Client-Based Access Control Management for XML documents
13
dictionary of tags [ABC04, TpH02]7. The set of tags that appear in the subtree rooted by an 
elemente, namedDescTage, can be encoded by a bit array, namedTagArraye, of lengthNt,
whereNt is the number of entries of the tag dictionary. A recursive encoding can further re-
duce the size of this metadata. Let us call DescTag(e)the bijective function that mapsTa-
gArraye into the tag dictionary to computeDescTage. We can trade storage overhead for 
computation complexity by reducing the image of DescTag(e)to DescTagparent(e) in place of 
the tag dictionary. The length of theTagArray structure decreases while descending into the 
document hierachy at the price of making theDescTag() function recursive. Since the num-
ber of element generally increases with the depth of the document, the gain is substantial.
To distinguish between intermediate nodes and leaves (that do not need the TagArray meta-
data), an additional bit is added to each node. 
Encoding the element tags: In a dictionary-based compression, the tag of eachlemente in
the document is replaced by a reference to the corresponding entry in the dictionary. 
Log2(Nt) bits are necessary to encode this reference. The recursive encoding of the set of 
descendant tags can be exploited as well to compress further the encoding of tags them-
selves. Using this scheme, Log2(DescTagparent(e)) bits suffice to encode the tag of an element
e.
Encoding the size of a subtree:Encoding the size of each subtree is mandatory to implement
the skip operation. At first glance, log2(size(document)) bits are necessary to encode Sub-
treeSizee, the size of the subtree rooted by an elemente. Again, a recursive scheme allows to 
reduce the encoding of this size to log2(SubtreeSize parent(e)) bits. Storing the SubtreeSize for 
each element makes closing tags unnecessary.
Decoding the document structure: The decoding of the document structure must be done by
the SOE, efficiently, in a streaming fashion and without consuming much memory. To this
end, the SOE stores the tag dictionary and uses an internalSkipStack to record the DescTag
and SubtreeSize of the current element. When decoding an elemente, DescTagparent(e) and 
SubtreeSizeparent(e)are retrieved from this stack and used to decode in turnTagArraye, Sub-
treeSizee and the encoded tag of e.
Updating the document:In the worst case, updating an element induces an update of the
SubtreeSize, the TagArray and the encoded tag of each e ncestors and of their direct chil-
dren. In the best case, only the SubtreeSize ofe ancestors need be updated. The worst case 
occurs in two rather infrequent situations. The SubtreeSize ofe ancestor’s children have to 
be updated if the size of e father grows (resp. shrinks) and jumps a power of 2. The TagAr-
ray and the encoded tag of e ancestor’s children have to be updated if the update of e gener-
ates an insertion or deletion in the tag dictionary.
4.2   Skip index usage 
As said before, the primary objective of the Skip index is to detect rules and queries that
cannot apply inside a given subtree. This means that any active token that cannot reach a final 
state in its ARA can be removed from the top of the Token Stack. Let us callRemainingLa-
bels(t) the function that determines the set of transition labels encountered in the path separat-
ing the current state of a tokent from the final state of its ARA, and let us call e the current
element in the document. A token t, either navigational or predicate, will be unable to reach a 
final state in its ARA if RemainingLabels(t) DescTage. Note that this condition is sufficient
but not necessary since the Skip index does not capture the element tags nesting.
Once this token filtering has been done, the probability for the DecideSubtree algorithm to 
reach a global decision about the subtree rooted by the current elemente is greatly increased 
since many irrelevant rules have been filtered. If this decision is negative ( ) or pending (?), a 
7 Considering the compression of the document content itself is out of the scope of this paper. Anyway,
value compression does not interfere with our proposal as far as the compression scheme remains com-
patible with the SOE resources. 
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skip of the subtree can be envisioned. This skip is actually possible if there are no more active 
tokens, either navigational or predicate, at the top of the Token Stack. The algorithm SkipSub-
tree given in Figure 6 decides whether the skip is o sible or not. Let us remark that this algo-
rithm should be triggered both on pen and close events. Indeed, each element may change the 
decision delivered by the algorithm DecideNode, then DecideSubtree and finally SkipSubtree
with the benefit of being able to skip a bigger subtree at the next step.
SkipSubtree ()  Decision  {true,false} 
1: For each token t TS[top].NT  TS[top].PT 
2: if RemainingLabels(t)  DescTage  then remove t from TS[top] 
3: if DecideSubTree()  { , ?} and  (TS[top].NT = ) and
4: (TS[top].PT = )  then return true 
5: else return false 
Figure 6. Skipping decision 
Figure 7 shows an illustrative XML document and itsencoding, a set of access rules and the 
skips done while analyzing the document. The information in grey is presented to ease the un-
derstanding of the indexing scheme but is not stored in the document.
Let us consider the document analysis (for clarity, we use below the real element tags in-
stead of their encoding). At the time element b (leftmost subtree) is reached, all the active rules 
are stopped thanks toTagArrayb and the complete subtree can be skipped (the decision is
due to the closed access control policy). When element c is reached, Rule R becomes pending. 
However, the analysis of the subtree continues since TagArrayc does not allow more filtering.
When element e is reached, TagArraye filters out rules R, T and U. Rule S becomes negative-
active when the value ‘3’ is encountered below element m. On the closing event, SkipSubtree
decides to skip the e subtree. This situation illustrate the benefit to trigger the SkipSubtree at 
each opening and closing events. The analysis continues following the same principle and leads 
to deliver the elements underlined in Figure 7.c. 
1
14
4
2 6
R: , / a [d = 4] / c
S: , // c / e[m=3]
T: , // c [// i = 3] // f 
U: , // h [k = 2]
31 2 3 6 9
3
5 7
1 2
2
1
3
3 2
m t p
1 2
m p m k
fm o p e g h i
b c d
a
(a) Encoded XML document
a bm o p cem3t p fm p g h m k2i3d4
(c) Skipping
(b) Access Control Rules
dikhgftecpomba
00000000011100
mop
01111111010100
ikhgftepm
000001011
tpm
010000001
km
000000011
pm
Tag dictionary
Figure 7. Skip index example 
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5 Management of pending predicates 
An element in the input document is said pending if its delivery depends on a pending rule,
that is a rule for which the navigational path final state has been reached but at least one predi-
cate path final state remains to be reached. This unfavorable case is unfortunately frequent. 
Indeed, any rule of the form /…/e[P] lead invariably to a pending situation. Any rule of the
form  /../e[P]/../ generates also a pending situation until P has been evaluated to true. Indeed, a 
false evaluation of P does not stop the pending situation because another instance of P may be 
true elsewhere in the document. By nature, pending predicates are incompatible with applica-
tions consuming documents in a strict streaming fashion (note that a predicate may remain
pending until the document end). Thus, when considering pending predicates, we make the
assumption that the terminal has enough memory to buffer the pending parts of the document or 
that these parts can be read back from the server wh n pending predicates are solved. These 
pending parts can clearly not be buffered inside the SOE considering the assumption made on 
its storage capacity. The objective pursued is therefore to detect pending elements or subtrees
and to leave them aside thanks to the Skip index until the pending situation is solved8. At that 
time, pending elements or subtrees are read back from the terminal. Although backward access 
to the document is unavoidable, the goal is to never read and analyze the same data twice. The 
skipping strategy and the associated reassembling strategy proposed below meet this require-
ment.
Pending subtrees are externalized at the time the logical expression conditioning their deliv-
ery is evaluated to true (e.g., //a[d=6]/b[c=5] requires that a d=6 and a c=5 are found to be true).
Therefore, pending subtrees can be delivered in an order different from their initial order in the
input document. The benefit of this asynchrony is to reduce the latency of the access control 
management and to free the SOE internal memory, at the price of a more complex reassembling
of the final result. Indeed, the initial parent, descendant and sibling relationships have to be
preserved at reassembling time. This forces to regist r, at parsing time, the following informa-
tion for each pending element: <value, level, skiptree, condition, anchor>. value is the node 
value (opening tag, text or closing tag) ;level refers to the element depth in the initial document
(we use the term level to avoid any confusion with the depth attached to tokens) ; skiptree is a 
boolean indicating whether the element is root of askipped pending subtree (this information is
required to externalize the complete subtree rooted a  this element in case of delivery) ; condi-
tion is the logical expression conditioning the delivery of the element/subtree (since several
pending elements are likely to depend on the same rule, logical expressions can be shared
among them to gain internal storage) ;anchor references the target position of the ele-
ment/subtree in the result. This information is kept for each pending element in aPending
Stack. The reassembling process is as follows:
Anchor assignation: Let assume that each elementin the result document is labeled by a 
unique numberNe (representing for example the ordering in which elements are delivered). 
The future position of a pending element’ in the result can be uniquely identified by a sin-
gle number using the following convention:Ne if e’ is a potential right sibling of e or -Ne if 
e’ is the potential leftmost child ofe. No anchor need be memorized for pending right sib-
lings and descendants of a pending elemente’ because: (1) they share e’ anchor until one of
their left sibling (see element delivery) or ancestor (see mbedded pending subtrees) i  de-
livered and (2) parent and sibling relationships among pending elements can be recovered
from the Pending Stack as follows:
 denotes the precedence relation in the Pending Stack 
A child_of B  B A  LevelA=LevelB+1  (  C / B C A  LevelC=LevelB)
8 Note that all pending subtrees cannot be skipped. The skipping condition is that the pending subtree 
does not contain tags useful for any ARA. Otherwise, new predicates may become pending due to the 
skip and may even generate a deadlock between pending predicates. In addition, blocking the progress of 
a navigational token due to a skip would introduce a tricky problem to recover a consistent ARA state at 
the time the pending predicate is solved.
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A right_sibling_of B  B A  LevelA=LevelB  (  C / B C A  LevelC LevelA)
Element delivery: At the timee’ is delivered, its place in the result document is determined
by its anchor (either memorized or recovered by the above mechanism). In turn,Ne’ (resp. -
Ne’) becomes the anchor of the pending right sibling (resp. pending leftmost child) ofe’, if 
any. If e’ skiptree is true, meaning thate’ descendants share the same delivery condition as 
e’, the whole subtree is read back from the input document, decrypted and delivered. Fi-
nally, e’ leaves the Pending Stack.
Embedded pending subtrees: a pending element may in turn be parent of several pending
elements or subtrees. Again, an innermost element/subtree may be delivered before the out-
ermost ones. The delivery principle detailed above tackles this tricky situation with no addi-
tional difficulty, under the assumption that the Struc ural rule is enforced. This rule states
that the result document must keep the same structure as the input one (cf . Section 2). En-
forcing this rule in our context means that all pending elements in the path from the deliv-
ered innermost element/subtree to its anchor (recovered from its ancestor chain) have to be
delivered too in the hierarchical order, still using the same delivery principle.
6 Random integrity checking 
Encryption and hashing are required to guarantee respectively the confidentiality and the integ-
rity of the input document. Unfortunately, standard integrity checking methods are badly
adapted to our context for two important reasons. Fir t, the memory limitation of the SOE im-
poses a streaming integrity checking. Second, the integrity checking must tackle the forward 
and backward random accesses to the document incurred by the Skip index and by the reas-
sembling of pending document fragments. In this section, we sketch the solutions we propose 
to face potential attacks on an input document. For conciseness, the details of the solutions are 
omitted and consigned in Appendix A. 
In a client-based context, the attacker is the userhimself. For instance, a user being granted
access to a medical folder X may try to extract unauthorized information from a medical folder 
Y. Let assume that the document is encrypted with a classic block cipher algorithm (e.g., DES 
or triple-DES) and that blocks are encrypted independently (e.g., following the ECB mode
[Sch96]), identical plaintext blocks will generate identical ciphered values. In that case, the 
attacker can conduct different attacks: substituting some blocks of folders X and Y to mislead
the access control manager and decrypt part of Y; building a dictionary of known plain-
text/ciphertext pairs from authorized information (e.g., folder X) and using it to derive unau-
thorized information from ciphertext (e.g., folder Y); making statistical inference on ciphertext.
Additionally, if no integrity checking occurs, the attacker can randomly modify some blocks,
inducing a dysfunction of the rule processor (e.g., Bob is authorized to access folders of pa-
tients older than 80 and he randomly alters the ciphertext storing the age). 
To face these attacks, we exploit two techniques. Rgarding encryption, the objective is to 
generate different ciphertexts for different instances of a same value. This property could be
obtained by using a Cipher Bloc Chaining (CBC) mode in place of ECB, meaning that the en-
cryption of a block depends on the preceding block [Sch96]. This however would introduce an 
important overhead at decryption time if random accesses are performed in the document. As
an alternative, we merge the position of a value with the value itself at encryption time. Regard-
ing integrity checking, the document is split into chunks whose size is determined by the mem-
ory capacity of the SOE. Each chunk contains an encrypted ChunkDigestcomputed using a 
technique adapted from the Merkle hash Tree [Mer90]. This technique gracefully combines
encryption and hashing functions to allow random accesses to any part of the document with an 
8 bytes alignment. The most original part of the proposed strategy is that integrity is checked in
cooperation with the untrusted terminal at the price of decrypting one digest per visited chunk
in the worst case (i.e., when the chunks accessed are not contiguous). As a conclusion, the 
document is protected against tampering and confidentiality attacks while remaining agnostic 
regarding the encryption algorithm used to cipher thelementary data. Unlike [HIL02, BoP02],
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we do no assumption on any particular way of encrypting data that could facilitate the query
execution at the price of a weaker robustness against cryptanalysis attacks.
7 Experimental results 
This section presents experimental results obtained from both synthetic and real datasets. We
first give details about the experimentation platform. Then, we analyze the storage overhead
incurred by the Skip index and compare it with possible variants. Next, we study the perform-
ance of access control management, query evaluation nd integrity checking. Finally, the global 
performance of the proposed solution is assessed on four datasets that exhibit different charac-
teristics.
Experimentation platform 
The abstract target architecture presented in Section 2 can be instantiated in many different
ways. In this experimentation, we consider that the SOE is embedded in an advanced smart
card platform. While existing smart cards are already powerful (32-bit CPU running at 30Mhz,
4 KB of RAM, 128KB of EEPROM), they are still too limted to support our architecture, es-
pecially in terms of communication bandwidth (9.6Kbps). Our industrial partner, Axalto (the
Schlumberger’s smart card subsidiary), announces by the end of this year a more powerful
smart card equipped with a 32-bit CPU running at 40Mhz, 8KB of RAM, 1MB of Flash and
supporting an USB protocol at 1MBps. Axalto provided us with a hardware cycle-accurate 
simulator for this forthcoming smart card. Our prototype has been developed in C and has been
measured using this simulator. Cycle-accuracy guarantees an exact prediction of the perform-
ance that will be obtained with the target hardware platform.
As this section will make clear, our solution is strongly bounded by the decryption and the 
communication costs. The numbers given in Table 1 allow projecting the performance results
given in this section on different target architectures. The number given for the smart card com-
munication bandwidth corresponds to a worst case where each data entering the SOE takes part 
in the result. The decryption cost corresponds to the 3DES algorithm, hardwired in the smart
card (line 1) and measured on a PC at 1Ghz (lines 2 and 3).
Context Communication Decryption
Hardware based (e.g., future smartcards) 0.5 MB/s 0.15 MB/s 
Software based - Internet connection 0.1 MB/s 1.2 MB/s
Software based - LAN connection 10  MB/s 1.2 MB/s 
Table 1. Communication and decryption costs 
In the experiment, we consider three real datasets: WSU corresponding to university
courses,Sigmod records containing index of articles and Tree Bank containing English sen-
tences tagged with parts of speech [UWX]. In addition, we generate a synthetic content for the
Hospital document depicted in Section 2 (real datasets are very difficult to obtain in this area), 
thanks to the ToXgene generator [ToX]. The characteristics of interest of these documents are 
summarized in Table 2.
WSU Sigmod Treebank Hospital
Size 1.3 MB 350KB 59MB 3.6 MB
Text size 210KB 146KB 33MB 2,1 MB
Maximum depth 4 6 36 8
Average depth 3.1 5.1 7.8 6.8
# distinct  tags 20 11 250 89
# text nodes 48820 8383 1391845 98310
# elements 74557 11526 2437666 117795
Table 2. Documents characteristics 
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Index storage overhead 
The Skip index is an aggregation of three techniques for encoding respectively tags, lists of
descendant tags and subtree sizes. Variants of the Skip index could be devised by combining
these techniques differently (e.g., encoding the tags and the subtree sizes without encoding the
lists of descendant tags makes sense). Thus, to evaluate the overhead ascribed to each of these
metadata, we compare the following techniques. NC corresponds to the original Non Com-
pressed document. TC is a rather classic Tag Compression method and will serve as reference. 
In TC, each tag is encoded by a number expressed with log2(#distinct tags) bits. We denote by
TCS (Tag Compressed and Subtree size) the method storing he subtree size to allow subtrees
to be skipped. The subtree size is encoded withlog2(compressed document size)bits. In TCS, 
the closing tag is useless and can be removed. TCSB complements TCS with a bitmap of de-
scendant tags encoded with#dictinct tags bits for each element. Finally, TCSBR is the recur-
sive variant of TCSB and corresponds actually to the Skip Index detailed in Section 4. In all
these methods, the metadata need be aligned on a byte frontier. Figure 8 compares these five
methods on the datasets introduced formerly. These datasets having different characteristics,
the Y-axis is expressed in terms of the ratios ructure/(text length).
Clearly, TC drastically reduces the size of the structure in all datasets. Adding the subtree
size to nodes (TCS) increases the structure size by 50%, up to 150% (big documents require an 
encoding of about 5 bytes for both the subtree sizeand the tag element while smaller docu-
ments need only 3 bytes). The bitmap of descendant tags (TCSB) is even more expensive, es-
pecially in the case of the Bank document which contains 250 distinct tags. TCSBR drastically
reduces this overhead and brings back the size of the structure near the TC one. The reason is 
that the subtree size generally decreases rapidly, as well as the number of distinct tags inside
each subtree. For the Sigmod document, TCSBR becomes even more compact than TC. 
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Access control overhead 
To assess the efficiency of our strategy (based on TCSBR), we compare it with: (i) a Brute-
Force strategy (BF) filtering the document without any index and (ii) a time lower bound LWB.
LWB cannot be reached by any practical strategy. It corresponds to the time required by an 
oracle to read only the authorized fragments of a document and decrypt it. Obviously, a genuine
oracle will be able to predict the outcome of all predicates – pending or not –  without checking
them and to guess where the relevant data are in th document.
Figure 9 shows the execution time required to evaluate the authorized view of the three pro-
files (Secretary, Doctor and Researcher) introduced in Section 2 on the Hospital document.
Integrity checking is not taken into account here. The size of the compressed document is
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2.5MB and the evaluation of the authorized view returns 135KB for the Secretary, 575KB for
the Doctor and 95 KB for the Researcher. In order to compare the three profiles despite this
size discrepancy, the Y-axis represents the ratio between each execution time and its respective 
LWB. The real execution time in seconds is mentioned on each histogram. To measure the im-
pact of a rather complex access control policy, we consider that the Researcher is granted ac-
cess to 10 medical protocols instead of a single one, each expressed by one positive and one
negative rule, as in Section 2.
The conclusions that can be drawn from this figure ar  threefold. First, the Brute-Force 
strategy exhibits dramatic performance, explained by the fact that the smart card has to read and 
decrypt the whole document in order to analyze it. Second, the performance of our TCSBR
strategy is generally very close to the LWB (let us recall that LWB is a theoretical and unreach-
able lower bound), exemplifying the importance of minimizing the input flow entering the
SOE. The more important overhead noticed for the Researcher profile compared to LWB is due 
to the predicate expressed on the protocol element that can remain pending until the end of each 
folder. Indeed, if this predicate is evaluated to false, the access rule evaluator will continue –
needlessly in the current case – to look at another instance of this predicate (see Section 5). 
Third, the cost of access control (from 2% to 15%) is largely dominated by the decryption cost 
(from 53% to 60%) and by the communication cost (from 30% to 38%). The cost of access 
control is determined by the number of active tokens thatare to be managed at the same time.
This number depends on the number of ARA in the access ontrol policy and the number of 
descendant transitions (//) and predicates inside each ARA. This explain the larger cost of
evaluating the Researcher access control policy. 
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Figure 9. Access control overhead 
Impact of queries 
To measure accurately the impact of a query in the global performance, we consider the
query //Folder[//Age>v] (v allows us to vary the query selectivity), executed over five different
views built from the preceding profiles and corresponding to: a secretary (S), a part-time doctor 
(PTD) having in charge few patients, a full-time doctor (FTD) having in charge many patients,
a junior researcher (JR) being granted access to few analysis results and a senior researcher 
(SR) being granted access to several analysis results.
Figure 10 plots the query execution time (including the access control) as a function of the
query result size. The execution time decreases linarly as the query and view selectivity’s in-
crease, showing the accuracy of TCSBR. Even if the query result is empty, the execution time
is not null since parts of the document have to be analysed before being skipped. The parts of 
the document that need be analysed depends on the view and on the query. The embedded fig-
ure shows the same linearity for larger values of the query result size. 
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Figure 11. Impact of integrity control
Evaluation of the integrity control
Figure 11 depicts the execution time required to build the authorized view of the Secretary, 
Doctor and Researcher profiles, including integrity checking. Comparing these results with
Figure 9 shows that the cost ascribed to integrity checking remains quite acceptable when using 
the technique proposed in Section 6 (from 32% to 38%). To better capture the benefit of this
technique, based on ECB and Merkle hash tree (ECB-MHT), we compare it with: (ECB) a ba-
sic ECB encryption scheme without hashing that enforces confidentiality but not tamper-
resistance; (CBC-SHA) a CBC encryption scheme comple ented by a SHA-1 hashing applied
to the clear text version of complete chunks (this solution represents the most direct application
of state-of-the-art techniques); (CBC-SHAC) that is similar to CBC-SHA except that the hash-
ing applies to ciphered chunks, thereby allowing the SOE to check the chunk digest without
decrypting the chunk itself. The results plotted in the figure are self-explanatory.
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To assess the robustness of our approach when different document structures are faced, we 
measured the performance of our prototype on the three real datasets WSU, Sigmod and Bank.
For these documents we generated random access rules (including // and predicates). Each 
document exhibits interesting characteristics. The Sigmod document is well-structured, non-
recursive, of medium depth and the generated access control policy was simple and not much
selective (50% of the document was returned). The WSU document is rather flat and contains a 
large amount of very small elements (its structure represents 78% of the document size after
TCSBR indexation). The Bank document is very large, contains a large amount of tags that
appear recursively in the document and the generated access control policy was complex (8 
rules). Figure 12 reports the results. We added in the figure the measures obtained with the
Hospital document to serve as a basis for comparisons. The figure plots the execution time in 
terms of throughput for our method and for LWB, both with and without integrity checking.
We show that our method tackles well very different situations and produces a throughput rang-
ing from 55KBps to 85KBps depending on the document and the access control policy. These 
preliminary results as encouraging when compared with xDSL Internet bandwidth available
nowadays (ranging from 16KBps to 128KBps).
Figure 12. Performance on real datasets 
8 Conclusion
Important factors motivate today the access control to be delegated to client devices. By com-
piling the access control policies into the data encryption, existing client-based access control 
solutions minimize the trust required on the client at he price of a rather static way of sharing
data. Our objective is to take advantage of new elements of trust in client devices to propose a 
client-based access control manager capable of evaluating dynamic access rules on a ciphered 
XML document.
The contribution of this paper is fourfold. First, we proposed a streaming evaluator of access 
control rules supporting a rather robust fragment of the XPath language. To the best of our knowl-
edge, this is the first paper dealing with XML access control in a streaming fashion. Second, we
designed a streaming index structure allowing skipping the irrelevant parts of the input document,
with respect to the access control policy and to a p tential query. This index is essential to circum-
vent the inherent bottlenecks of the target architecture, namely the decryption cost and the commu-
nication cost. Third, we proposed a graceful management of pending predicates. Fourth, we 
proposed a combination of hashing and encryption techniques to make the integrity of the
document verifiable despite the forward and backward r ndom accesses generated by the pre-
ceding contributions.
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Our experimental results have been obtained from a C prototype running on a hardware cy-
cle-accurate smart card simulator provided by Axalto. The global throughput measured is
around 70KBps and the relative cost of the access control is less than 20% of the total cost. 
These first measurements are promising and demonstrate the applicability of the solution. A 
Javacard prototype has been developed on a USB e-gate sm rt card and was rewarded by the 
Silver Award of the e-gate open 2004 contest organized by Sun, Axalto and ST-
Microelectronics.
Open issues concern the better use of query containment techniques to improve the optimiza-
tion before and during the access rules evaluation as well as the definition of more accurate 
streaming indexation techniques. More generally, client-based security solu ions deserve a spe-
cial attention for the new research perspectives thy broaden and for their foreseeable impact on 
a growing scale of applications.
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Appendix A : Encryption and Random Integrity Checking 
This appendix details the strategies introduced in Section 6 to ensure the integrity and the opac-
ity of the input document, despite random accesses to this document and taking into account the
memory limitation of the SOE. This means that no information can be inferred from the en-
crypted document and neither random modification nor substitution of encrypted blocks can be 
performed without being detected by the SOE. In this section, we consider an XML document
of any size, split in chunks (e.g., 2 KB), divided in small fragments (e.g., 256 bytes), and in turn 
subdivided in blocks of 8 bytes. The chunk partition s required to make the integrity checking 
compatible with the memory capacity of the SOE, fragments are introduced to allow random
accesses inside a chunk and the block is the unit of encryption. 
Let us first consider data encryption. As explained in Section 6, different ciphertexts must
be generated for different instances of a same value in order to prevent basic attacks. Cipher
Bloc Chaining (CBC) meets this requirement but incurs a non-negligible overhead. Indeed, 
each time the SOE accesses randomly a block in the document, the previous block has to be
transferred too. In place of CBC, we perform an exclusive OR (denoted by ) between each 8 
byte block and the position of this block in the document, before encrypting the result in Elec-
tronic-CodeBook (EBC) mode. The encryption itself is performed with a triple-DES algorithm
but other algorithms could be used to this purpose. Thus, a plaintext blockb at absolute posi-
tion p in the document is encrypted by Ek(b p), where k is a secret key attached to the docu-
ment and stored in the SOE. Keyk can be permanently stored in the SOE or can be downloaded
thanks to a secure channel along with the access control rules attached to a given (document,
user) pair.
Encryption alone is not sufficient to guarantee the document integrity since the attacker can 
perform random modifications and substitutions in the ciphertext. Thus, we use a collision re-
sistant hash function (e.g., SHA-1) to compute a digest of each chunk, called ChunkDigest, that 
prevents any tampering to occur without impacting this digest. Each chunk containing an iden-
tifier reflecting its position in the document, block substitutions can be easily detected. The
hashing is done on the ciphertext in order to allow the cooperation of the terminal, at integrity
checking time, in case of a random access (see below). 
Based on this digest, a basic solution to control integrity can be envisioned. When the SOE
accessesn bytes at positionposin a chunk, the terminal computes the hashing of the pos-1 pre-
ceding bytes and transmits its intermediate result to the SOE. Since hashing is computed incre-
mentally, the SOE can continue the hashing computation on encrypted data and checks the in-
tegrity of the received data by comparing the final h shed value to ChunkDigest. Remark that 
ChunkDigest must be encrypted to prevent the terminal to compute by itself a new digest corre-
sponding to tampered data. This solution incurs to communicate sizeof(ChunkDigest) + 
sizeof(Chunk) – (pos-1)bytes to the SOE and to decryptsizeof(ChunkDigest) + n bytes in the
SOE.
Although correct, the preceding solution reduces thbenefit of small skips in the document
since the target chunk must always be read by the SOE from the position pos of interest until its 
end. Thus, sizeof(Chunk) – (pos-1) – n irrelevant bytes have to be transferred to the SOE. We
propose below a more accurate solution that adapts the Merkle hash tree principle introduced in
[Mer90]. In this solution, each chunk is divided into m fragments, wherem is a power of 2, and 
thesem fragments are organized in a binary tree. A hash value is computed for each fragment
and then attached to each leaf of the binary tree. Each intermediated node of the tree contains a 
hash value computed on the concatenation of its children hash value. The ChunkDigest corre-
sponds to the hash value attached to the binary tree root. When the SOE accesses n bytes at
positionpos in a fragmentf of a given chunk, the terminal sends: 1) the bytes fromp s up to
the end of fragmentf, that is sizeof(fragment) – (pos–1) bytes including then bytes of interest;
2) the intermediate hashing computation of thepos-1 first bytes of fragmentf; 3) the hashing
INRIA
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information computed on the other fragments following theMerkle hash tree strategy; and 4) 
the encrypted ChunkDigest. Thanks to this information, the SOE can recompute the root of the
Merkle hash tree and compare it to ChunkDigest as pictured in Figure F1. 
H1 H2 H3 H4 H5 H6 H7 H8
H12 H34 H56 H78
H1234 H5678
HC
E
n
c
ry
p
te
d
 H
C
The SOE accesses fragment F3
The terminal computes
 H4 = Hash(F4)
 H12 = Hash(Hash(F1), Hash(F2))
 H5678 = Hash( Hash(Hash(F5), Hash(F6)),
Hash(Hash(F7), Hash(F8)))
The terminal sends   H4, H12, H5678 and the encrypted HC
The SOE computes H3 = Hash(F3) and HC based on the
hash values sent by the terminal. It decrypts the encrypted HC 
sent by the terminal and compares it to its own HC.
F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 F6 F7 F8
Figure F1. Random integrity checking 
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